The role of the reactor size for an investment in the nuclear sector: an evaluation of not-financial parameters".
Introduction
The IAEA defines as "small" those reactors having the electrical output lower than 300 MWe and as "medium'' those reactors having the electrical output between 300 and 700 MWe (IAEA, 2006) . SMRs were developed during the '50s and the '60s: then, in order to exploit the "economy of scale", the design was scaled to 1 GW and more. Nowadays there is a renewed 
Spinning Reserves Management
Ancillary services 2 are in charge to maintain the security and the quality of electricity supply . To control the system frequency is the most important of them: it requires that a certain amount of active power be kept in reserves, to re-establish the balance between load and generation in continuous. Such reserves are usually named as "spinning reserves", but his definition varies among countries according to (BERIZZI, A., Bovo, C., Benini, M., Migliavacca, G., 2005) , , (KIRBY, B.J.,
2003):
 time to be fully available to serve loads;
 sources of power: synchronized or un-synchronized power stations, responsive loads, etc;
 automatic supply or under signal of the Transmission System Operator (TSO).
For our purpose, we define spinning reserves as the unutilized generation capacity which can be activated by the TSO to control the electric system frequency, independently from the time window of availability. Consider six units serving six isolated load areas: when unit #6 turns-off, the 6 th area demand should be satisfied by the other active units. After the first frequency drop, units serving areas from 1 to 5 will increase their output under signal from TSO. (Hp.: grid connections have sufficient transport capacity to accept additional load. Grid constraints will be evaluated in other factors).
2 Functions performed by electrical generating, transmission, system-control, and distribution system equipment and people to support the basic services of generating capacity, energy supply, and power delivery Spinning reserves could be a differential factor because the smaller is the size of lost unit, the smaller is the necessary reserves, however this link is not so direct. Supply of the spinning reserves is a TSO's responsibility: it buys forecasted bands of generation capacity from utilities through mechanisms, markets and prices which are always country-dependent. In every case, spinning reserves are a cost for the TSO and so, indirectly, for the final user. TSO must manage a trade-off between the willingness to guarantee security of supply and the need to contain costs. , 1999) , (RUIZ, P.A., Sauer, P.W., 2008) , (STREIFFERT, D., 1995) . They require the estimation of the probability and amount of load shedding for different system conditions, which represents a possible difficulty (MOYA, O.E., 2005) .
To establish a new NPP could require a boost in the spinning reserves. The following procedure quantifies the impact of reactor size on the required reserves under two assumptions:
 total amount of reserves is equal to the foreseen LC (security method);
 price of reserves is always fixed by market. The procedure assumes a medium constant price: the smaller LC is, the smaller required reserves are and the lower the bills will be.
The main steps are:
1. Split electric system in different areas which can be considered like isolated systems (O'SULLIVAN, J.W., O'Malley, M.J., 1999): we assume that only units of the same area can supply active power.
2. Calculate the LC for every area: it is the sum of the two largest generating units. The Worst Event (WE) is the contemporary outage of the two main autonomous groups of generation in the area.
3. Hypothesize to establish in each area a 1340 MWe LR or four stand-alone 335 MWe SMR.
Calculate new LC for each of new cases and the difference from the actual LC. If difference is not zero, new NPPs increase required spinning reserves and the burden for TSO.
4. Sum the differences of all areas for each configuration: one LR and four SMRs. Results measure the increase of reserves due to LRs or SMRs construction on the whole territory.
The nearer to one the ratio between sums is, the smaller the differential impact will be.
Impact of spinning reserves is country-dependent and has the potential to strongly promote the SMR choice. It depends on the established generating units and on their geographic distribution Italian scenario TERNA, the Italian TSO, buys spinning reserves and other ancillary services in the Market for Dispatching Services (MSD). In MSD, utilities offer their willingness to vary their output for a certain amount, in response of signals from TSO; TSO buys this right (BERIZZI, A., Bovo, C., Benini, M., Migliavacca, G., 2005) . The ancillary services are specified in (TERNA, 2004) : there are three different kinds of reserves but only secondary and tertiary reserves compose spinning reserves as previously defined. Primary reserve is activated automatically and TSO does not pay for it, because (TERNA, 2004) provides that every generating unit must guarantee a ±1,5% band of capacity for the continuous balance of the system. So, it is not differential for our purpose. In case of outages, primary reserve is exploited automatically after the immediate fall of frequency.
It must be restored as soon as possible by secondary and, next, tertiary reserves that TERNA bought on forecast base.
Assuming that total amount acquired by TERNA derives from LC evaluations, we apply the algorithm to the Italian case. Italian electric system was split in the same eight areas used by National Control Centre of TERNA. They can be considered as isolated systems because interconnections between them are the most congested (TERNA, 2008) , (TERNA, 2009 The construction of a LR in every area would require a 61,8% higher reserves, while SMRs do not vary the actual situation.
The ratio between sums is equal to 0 and confirms that impact on required spinning reserves strongly promotes the SMR choice. This evaluation of the impact can be understood from Figure 1 . Let us consider the connections with unit #6: if one (or more) of them fails, the whole output of generating site will flow through the remaining lines. For the same level of lines' congestion, the larger the site's output is and the higher the risk of following overloads will be. So, it is obvious that a LR increases grid vulnerability with respect to the installation of a stand-alone SMR. The differential impact is higher in the case of generation nodes connected to the most congested transmission lines.
Electric Grid Vulnerability
Electric grid vulnerability has the potential to be strongly differential and to promote the SMR choice. Obviously this factor is not differential considering four SMRs in the same site.
Italian scenario
In The two different sides of public acceptance have different impacts on the choice of size.
Overall population's attitude
In the nuclear field this factor is controversial. Even if the technology is intrinsically safe and there are not externalities, the public in many countries does not support nuclear energy (SCHNEIDER, M., Thomas, S., Froggatt, A., Koplow, D., 2009 ).
This is because, in the public's mind, a system with small probability of failure and large consequences is seen as more risky than the opposite, as the common fear of air crashes (SJOBERG, L., 1999). Fischoff's law (FISCHOFF, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., Combs, B., 1978) bears that level of acceptable risk is inversely related to the number of people exposed to that risk. Slovic (SLOVIC, P., Fischoff, B., Lichtenstein, S., 1980) concluded that belief about the catastrophic potential of nuclear power is the major determinant of public opposition. Other main factors influencing the attitude toward NPPs are:
 trust in government and institutions (SLOVIC, P., 1993);
 knowledge and competences on nuclear topics, which are tightly related to active nuclear power generation in the country (SLOVIC, P., Fischoff, B., Lichtenstein, S., 1980);  timing and level of public involvement in the decision. Public accepts risks from voluntary activities roughly 1000 times greater than from involuntary activities that provide the same level of benefit (FISCHOFF, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., Combs, B., 1978);
 risk perception about waste management and disposal (SJOBERG, L., 2009 These issue will become differential only with the exploitation of IV GEN disruptive technologies. Considering near-term technologies, overall population's attitude is not differential.
Local population's attitude
Attitude of local communities toward nuclear energy could be different from the majority of country's population. The main cause is the Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) syndrome: even if public does not oppose building of new NPPs, it is possible a fierce opposition from local communities who will have to host them.
NIMBY phenomenon is probably due to the way people evaluate risks in a siting situation:
perceived risks become the overriding factor and the weighting given to a potential benefit is greatly reduced (TANAKA, Y., 2004) . Educational system, experience in infrastructure project management and culture-specific features vary the syndrome's intensity.
Where NIMBY is strong, to find four different sites for SMRs is more difficult than a single LR site, because to solve local oppositions requires a great effort in terms of "diseconomy of hassle"
(INGERSOLL, D.T., 2009), money and risk augmentation.
In this case, public acceptance is differential and promotes few large power sites. So, to consider four SMRs in the same site makes public acceptance not differential, even in the case of strong NIMBY syndrome. Conversely, to spread four SMRs in four sites can be challenging.
Italian scenario
The lack of public nuclear knowledge is specific of the Italian case because of 20 years of The Decide-Announce-Defend approach (KUHNREUTHER, H., Linnerooth-Bayer, J., Fitzgerald, K., 1996) used by Italian government has reinforced NIMBY phenomenon. So, in the Italian case, to quadruple sites is strongly less convenient than the single site alternative.
Technical Siting Constraints
Besides NIMBY, already addressed in section 5, there are technical constraints that a site must satisfy.
The most important constraints in the choice of NPP site (KUHNREUTHER, H., LinneroothBayer, J., Fitzgerald, K., 1996), (MACINTOSH, A., 2007) can be clustered in two classes. Population density. Advanced SMRs present improvements in overall defence-in-depth (IAEA, 2008) , that will enable a reduction in the EPZ requirements. However, since no one regulatory system has modified EPZ requirements until now and supposing the same scenario for the future , this sub-factor reduces SMRs' flexibility because they need four different sites.
Constraints differential only if a single unit is compared to four stand-alone
Others. Some sub-factors impede installation of both LRs and SMRs in a certain area, but they are differential anyway. In countries where these features are common, it is more difficult to find four different areas available for stand-alone SMRs. This group includes:
 volcanic or tsunami dangers;
 risks of extreme whether events as cyclones or floods;
 ecological, heritage or tourist areas etc.;
Constraints differential in every configuration
Seismic robustness. The smaller size of SMRs' nuclear island facilitates the use of seismic isolators similar to those used for conventional buildings (INGERSOLL, D.T., 2009). They permit to standardize NPP seismic protection: it is less expensive if compared to the site-specific requirements of LRs.
Transport infrastructure. In some instances large vessels and modules used in LRs limit the siting of new plant to coastal areas or along major rivers. In contrast, many SMRs' components can be transported by smaller river barges, rail or trucks: smaller components allow a higher flexibility in siting for SMRs.
Technical siting constraints are country-specific differential. Every sub-factor has different importance in each country: the objective is to understand if relevant issues for the country give more flexibility to the siting of SMRs or not.
Italian scenario
SMRs fit better Italian electricity grid (MANCINI, M., Locatelli, G., Tammaro, S., 2009) and his spread seismologic activity. Large modules and higher needs of cool water push the siting of LRs to coastal areas, because of the lack of Italian high flow river. Of-A-Kind), supply chain and construction risks.
FOAK risks
They are risks with the same probability of occurrence for both SMRs and LRs, but they have differential magnitude in the two cases. In fact, these risks impact on the capital employed in the single FOAK: it is smaller for SMRs, therefore size does not reduce probability, but reduces the impact of risks. The major FOAK risks are: All the three classes have the same probability to impact on SMRs or LRs, but capital on which they impact is always lower in the SMR case.
Supply chain risks
They include all the uncertainties on having the right resources (components, modules and equipments) on the right place at the right time. The exploitation of pre-fabrication, modularisation and standardization in SMRs' design can further control these risks (FORUM, U.S. DOE Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee and Generation IV Interational, 2002).
The specific construction approach is technology-dependent, but through a smaller size:  SMRs' components and modules can be produced by a greater number of suppliers in the world, reducing worldwide backlog. Detailed engineering of GEN III/III+ SMRs is not complete: of course, a higher number of suppliers will be available only when the production process of every component will be known;
 modularized elements of SMRs were designed to be transported in an easier way: SMRs have a higher percentage of modules transportable by trucks or rail, even if the precise configuration is technology-dependent. So, the supply chain is less vulnerable to delays, especially in case of interrelated deliveries.
Construction phase risks
A considerable vulnerability of large plant construction is the amount of work that must be performed on site [2] . The SMRs' higher percentage of components fabricated in factory implies:
 improvement of on-site personnel safety, because they handle fewer modules;
 simpler assembly operations, thanks to standardization and a module-oriented design;
 lower drop-off in field installation effectiveness when the design is reproduced at another site by a different construction team. A factory standard set of assemblies reduces the construction time variability (WALLACE, E., Matzie, R., Heiderd, R., Maddalena, J., 2006);  special equipments, as Very Heavy Lift cranes for installation, or large barges for transport, are not required for some SMR designs. Even if they were necessary, their purchase can be justified by the higher number of SMR units. In both instances, it is possible to avoid delays related to scarce co-ordination between equipment rents and previous scheduled activities.
Every class of risk promotes the SMR choice.

Italian scenario
Debate on the Italian nuclear comeback is very recent: every source of uncertainty is important in this phase. The Decide-Announce-Defend approach of the beginning is the opposite of the UK strategy to obtain public support. Besides, the two opposite political forces still have different beliefs on nuclear energy and a safety authority has not yet been appointed.
Uncertainties afflicting the Italian case amplified SMR's benefits for the mitigation of every class of risks.
In the Italian case, high risks associated to the nuclear projects promote the SMR choice, thanks to the lower capital they put on risk.
Impact on National Industrial System
This factor is important especially for a public investor: the higher is the percentage of manufacturing and construction work content assignable to national industries, the higher the positive effect on GDP of the country will be.
There has been no real growth in the nuclear industry for many years and the consequence is the current shortfall in qualified suppliers of nuclear equipments and components (ENERGY, U.S.
Department of, 2001), (ASSOCIATION, Nuclear Industry, 2008) .
New suppliers of nuclear renaissance need:
 a nuclear-grade qualification as ASME N-Stamp;
 manufacturing system adjustments: the shortfall of suppliers is also related to bottlenecks in manufacturing capacity (SCHNEIDER, M., Thomas, S., Froggatt, A., Koplow, D., 2009).
Considering the comparison between LRs and SMRs, the steps for the ASME N-Stamp certification are not size-dependent. The main limit for national industries to become suppliers of new NPPs is related to the capacity of their production systems.
The two main drivers that define the technical feasibility of NPPs' components are dimension and complexity: the higher they are and the higher investments for machinery and know-how will be. Figure 2 presents GEN III+ LR's and SMR's value breakdown obtained from expert elicitation. However, every design has its own features and would require specific considerations: for example, IRIS's integral layout implies the fabrication of a forged vessel which can be included among large dimension components. Main purpose of the approach is to depict the potential differential impact of "average" large and small-medium designs from a qualitative point of view.
Evolutionary components are parts which fabrication process is known: for the revolutionary components, instead, vendors know expected features but there is still need for research on materials and fabrication process required to obtain them. The components in the highlight areas require lower investment in machinery and know-how acquisition:  if component design is standard and well-known, its development and fabrication will be cheaper and will require lighter development of new competences.
[FIGURE 2 HERE] Figure 2 -LRs' and SMRs' value breakdown
SMR concentrates in the highlight areas (that we can consider as "not critical") a value 20-30% superior than LR, therefore the value in critical areas for SMR is 10% instead of 40% as for LR.
The final considerations are:
1. SMRs require a less capital intensive investment for the development of know-how and manufacturing systems required to become a nuclear-grade supplier. Effort to buy large capacity machinery and to find competences (for example training of a large forgings master took about 10 years) required by LR can make the investment for a new comer prohibitive; 2. the equipment cost for four SMRs is about 20% higher than for LR because of the economy of scale (CARELLI, M.D., Garrone, P., Locatelli, G., Mancini, M., Mycoff, M., Trucco, P.,
Ricotti, M.E., 2009). The difference is a burden for investors but the other side of the coin is
that it contributes to the economic justification of suppliers' investments.
So, SMRs have the potential to develop a wider supply chain with a higher number of suppliers inside national burdens. Investment to become a SMR supplier is more competitive. Difference with LR investment is heavier for industries of countries with low participation in nuclear supply chain.
In general, impact on national industrial system is differential and promotes the SMR choice.
Italian scenario
U.K. Nuclear Industry Association (ASSOCIATION, Nuclear Industry, 2008) states that national industries will be able to supply about the 80% of total value of new expected LRs. The difference with the achievable percentage by SMR choice is low for a country that maintained his industrial infrastructure, also because currently it operates NPPs.
Italian industries instead have kept only a little participation in the nuclear supply chain. To face a new nuclear program, Italian industrial system needs higher number of N-Stamp qualified firms, new manufacturing capacity and to recover best manufacturing practices.
SMR choice can increase the involvement of Italian firms in the new nuclear program.
Through expert elicitation it was estimated that 50-60% of SMRs' value could be supplied by Italian industries, against the 40% of a LR.
Time-to-market
Time to market is the time required to license and build planned NPPs, and so to sell the first MWh to the electric system. It limits the opportunities created by the broad-scale deregulation of many electricity markets in the world (ENERGY, U.S. Department of, 2001).
Licensing time.
Since all the SMRs in the same site are identical, it is oblivious that the same steps in the licensing process, after the first unit, become redundant. Licensing time for a SMR NOAK (Nth-Of-A-Kind), in a certain site, will be shorter than a LR (MANCINI, M., Locatelli,
G., Tammaro, S., 2009). On the contrary, it is equal considering the FOAK unit of SMRs and
LRs. Since the first MWh will be sold after the delivery of the FOAK, the licensing time is not a differential part of LRs' and SMRs' time-to-market.
Construction time. The differential part of time-to-market is the construction timeframe: it
includes the pre-construction and site preparation activities, plant construction (from first concrete to fuel load), fuel load and pre-operational testing.
Site preparation and procurement for a LR take 1.5 years, while field installation and preoperational tests take 3.5 years: the total construction time for a LR is five years, considering the By reducing the gap between the Italian generation and demand, it will be possible to free the saturated grid interconnections with other European countries. Once happens that so different prices will be really connected, deregulated market mechanisms will be able to reduce Italian electricity price. The two-years lower SMR's time-to-market would accelerate this process.
In the Italian case time-to-market strongly promotes the SMR choice.
Competences Required for the Operations
In next years, the world will face a shortage of people with high level of knowledge and skills in  the lower number of systems and components can result in a direct reduction of the number of inspection, testing and maintenance activities.
Even if literature supports that SMRs require a lower average degree of nuclear competences, utilities, agencies and government will require some high-level operators to carry out the main tasks in new NPPs. Therefore, SMRs will require competences till the same high level of LRs, as in figure 3.
So if:
1. range of competences is equal;
2. number of operators of SMRs are higher than LRs; 3. medium staffing requirements for SMRs are lower (IAEA, 2001 ); the conclusion is that SMRs require a lower percentage of high-level operators than LRs do (Figure 3 ). Competences are not differential for countries where education system gives an average highlevel of basic technical knowledge, so that the successive training will be able to form high-level operators. If competences owned by graduates are poor, training programs can not create highlevel operators.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Italian scenario
Italy has suffered the lack of NPPs for 20 years but has been able to maintain core skills and competences:
1. there are six nuclear engineering master degree courses and other less specific university courses. Many of these involve participation to International projects and with worldwide NSSS Vendors;
2. there are two reactors for research;
3. Enel, the biggest Italian utility, is involved in foreign nuclear projects:
 it is constructing two 440 MWe reactors in Mochovne (Slovakia);
 operates the nuclear power plant in Cernavoda (Romania);
 owns 12,5% of the capital employed in Flamanville project and sent 60 Italian engineers for training in the new Europen Pressurized Reactor (EPR) site.
Enel estimated that commercial operations of the first NPP will start in 2020, while the last of four foreseen EPR will start in 2025. Considering that the whole 13 GWe Italian nuclear program will be covered in the 2020-2025 timeframe, the Italian system will have to educate 200 nuclear engineers every year, in opposition to the actual 80.
Competences might be slightly differential in the Italian case.
Education system and utilities' programs are able to create high-level nuclear operators. The 10-years time window permits to achieve the number of experts required, through adequate campaigns of university promotion. So, Italy has the potential to satisfy the need of competences for the operations of both LRs and SMRs.
Impact on Employment
This aspect is important especially for a public investor because welfare of the country is an important objective of his mission. However, a private investor will be interested to the 
Construction phase
There are three different impacts on employment:
1. Direct. People employed in the manufacturing of components and modules, on-site construction and operation of NPP.
2. Indirect. Jobs created in the extended nuclear supply chain: suppliers of equipment manufacturers, suppliers of machineries and building materials, agencies for inspection and safety controls.
3. Induced. Jobs created in non-nuclear industries due to the new jobs added in the previous categories. They are the sum of non-nuclear jobs that would be created because of industry growth, such as additional grocery store employees, school teachers and residential construction workers. These jobs have a significant impact especially in local economies, as reported in (BEZDEK, R.H., Wendling, R.M., 2006) , (INSTITUTE, Nuclear Energy, 2006) , (INSTITUTE, Nuclear Energy, 2004) .
The differential impact on new jobs creation is evaluated considering the comparison between a LR and four SMRs in the same site.
Oxford's study (ECONOMICS, Oxford, 2008) Multipliers indicate that off-site direct employment drives greater indirect and induced effects than on-site direct employment. So, SMRs create a more beneficial impact thanks to the higher work content of facilities and the following induced effects. Moreover, this welfare benefit does not undermine attractiveness of the investment.
2. The amount of on-site employment is in Figure 5 . The phased demand for LR is from (ECONOMICS, Oxford, 2008) . We re-arranged the approach to three-years-construction
SMRs to obtain a plausible schedule.
[FIGURE 5 HERE] demand is more time-levelled, therefore it will be easier to face the shortage of qualified construction workers, even if the total number of man years is higher than LR. costs, so operational work content will experience roughly the same increase.
Operation phase
Concluding:
 SMRs create a higher number of new jobs also in the operation phase;
 new operation positions still involve indirect and induced impacts: SMRs and LRs are characterized by equal multipliers (ECONOMICS, Oxford, 2008) , but they amplify the higher direct operation employment of the SMR.
Impact on operation employment is differential and promotes the SMR choice.
Italian scenario
In the Italian scenario there is not a full employment of the population, even considering people with a technical education, so this impact is differential. Only in a country with a full employment this factor will not be differential.
Incremental Design Robustness
A high level of safety is the result of a complex interaction between good design, operational safety and human performances, but design features are able to impact on all these three dimensions. By the concept of design robustness the objective is to combine and to evaluate three key strategic performance areas: reactor safety, radiation safety (public and occupational) and safeguards, according to Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) of NRC (COMMISSION, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory, 2000) . From these key areas, we define Design Robustness the reactor's capability to assure the core's integrity, the core's protection and the integrity of all the other components of the nuclear island, in order to guarantee the radiation safety of personnel, population and environment in every condition. It is possible to evaluate the size impact on design robustness considering the three areas separately. 3. Public Radiation Safety considers collective radiation exposure to liquid and gaseous effluents from routine nuclear reactor operations. Size does not impact on technological solutions for the control of these releases.
4. Safeguards refer to physical protection of the facility and proliferation resistance. Charlton (CHARLTON, W.S., Le Bouf, R.F., Gariazzo, C., Ford, D.G., Beard, C., Landsberger, S., Whitaker, M., 2008) produces a report that can be considered the most relevant for this theme, synthesizing the parameter in a likelihood scale from 0 to 1, where the highest is the value, the highest is the proliferation risk. For a typical PWR LR of GEN III this value is 0,07, while for a SMR case with a batch loading of the fuel the parameter becomes 0,06.
Moreover, portion of SMRs' containment can be located above the ground, as for IRIS: the cost would be prohibitive for LRs. This potential low SMRs' profile makes them an extremely difficult target for aircraft flying terrorists.
Design robustness is strictly design-specific but simplification, standardization and compactness of SMRs permit to obtain certain improvement on reactor safety and physical protection. If utilities follow best common practices during outages, occupational exposure will not penalize SMRs.
Design robustness is differential and promotes the SMR choice
Italian scenario
Previous conclusion is true in the Italian scenario too, but it will be necessary to import best foreign practices to control personnel exposure.
Historical and Political Aspects
Beside technical and financial aspects another factor is a key driver to choose a NPP: the historical relationships among industries and between industries and national states. For instance since the French state owns both Areva (the vendor) and Electricité de France (the buyer), the French reactors will be, for sure, all EPR (or a design from Areva). This factor is fundamental even if in a country there are not vendors. Also in this case the country could host contractors with an historical collaboration with certain vendors and/or the utilities could already have a relationship in a foreign market with vendors or utilities. This kinds of collaboration are usually based on long term agreements, therefore represent a driver toward the choice of a certain reactors.
Two aspects have to be considered in order to quantify this factor:
1 -the strength of the relationship among the partners: in a certain country, different firms or utilities could have a relationship with different foreign vendors.
2 -the portfolio of vendors' products: there are vendors with only design of LRs, while others offer a portfolio made of LRs and SMRs.
Considering these aspects, a tight relationship with a vendor of LR could preclude the choice of SMRs.
Italian scenario
For what concern Italian scenario, the nowadays most important utility -ENEL -has a long term relationship with EdF (therefore Areva), with a 12.5% equity stake on 6 nuclear plants.
Contrariwise, Ansaldo Nucleare, the main Italian designer and contractor in the nuclear sector, is strongly related with Westinghouse developer of AP1000 and IRIS reactors. Other industries and utilities have relationships with these two vendors, therefore different scenarios are under consideration even if in this type of analysis the scenarious can completely and quickly change
Conclusions
The choice of NPP 's size is a degree of freedom that in the nuclear industry can play a primary role in many markets. It is already been proved that, in certain scenario, the loss of economy of scale can be balanced by the "economies of multiples" such as standardization, learning, cost sharing, modularization etc. Besides the financial parameters, there are many other "not monetary factors" able to dramatically influence the choice of an investor toward SMRs or LRs.
This paper goes through all these "external factors" providing the definitions, the methods of quantification and the evaluations with respect to the Italian scenario. The results clearly indicate that SMRs fit better, or at least as LRs, all the factors. However it is important to point out that
Italian NIMBY syndrome limits the possibility of spreading SMRs in different sites, and so to exploit the advantages in grid stability and site availability. Therefore, the only plausible scenario for the Italian case is the concentration of four SMRs in each site. Respect to this configuration, the SMRs still reap many advantages through all the life cycle. During the planning and construction phases, more sites can be exploited, the time to market is shorter, there are less risks associated to the construction and a higher benefit for national industries. In the operation phase, SMRs provide more job positions and do not require additional costs in terms of spinning reserves.
This work represents an improvement with respect to the framework presented last year and contains its application to the Italian scenario, even if most of the considerations can apply to many countries. Further research activities include the extension of this framework to other countries interested in NPP and the integration of external factors with financial factors, in order to provide an overall evaluation of the investment. Moreover, it will be interesting to evaluate the better mix of SMRs and LRs installations. 
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